Zedra Trust Company (UK) Limited v Graham David Tustain

9th October 2026

Judge

Chief Master Shuman

Citation(s)

  • [2026] EWHC 2578 (BP)

Summary

Section 20(3)(a) MCA 2005 provides that a deputy “may not be given powers with respect to […] the settlement of any of P’s property, whether for P’s benefit or for the benefit of others.” This decision of Chief Master Shuman shows what happens when that limit is ignored. Six discretionary settlements made by a property and affairs deputy in 2011, without an order of the Court of Protection, were declared void ab initio, together with associated loans of more than £2.7 million. Although the assets had been administered as trust property for many years, the beneficial interest in them had never left P.

The consequences for the professional trustee are dealt with in a separate judgment: Zedra Trust Company (UK) Limited v Graham David Tustain (Section 61) [2026] EWHC 2576 (BP), which we note below.

Mr Tustain had lacked capacity to manage his property and affairs since a brain injury in about 1984. Nigel Yeadon, a solicitor, became his receiver in 1993 and, when the MCA 2005 came into force, his deputy. An Extended General Order made in 2006 had expressly withheld authority to execute a settlement on Mr Tustain’s behalf without a further order.

In 2010, Mr Tustain won about £4.4 million on the National Lottery. Mr Yeadon applied to the Court of Protection for further authority, putting forward proposals that included a discounted gift trust. The order made on 5 July 2011 appointed him deputy with general authority and referred to a discounted gift trust. A further order in October 2011 authorised gifts of £50,000 to each of Mr Tustain’s seven siblings.

In November and December 2011, Mr Yeadon executed six discretionary settlements on Mr Tustain’s behalf. Under five of them, more than £2.7 million of Mr Tustain’s money was lent to the trustees, unsecured and interest-free. The beneficiaries were his siblings and their descendants; Mr Tustain himself was expressly excluded. The trustees included Barclays Bank Trust Company Limited, now Zedra, the claimant.

No order authorising the settlements was ever made. The trusts were administered for years, and £133,000 was distributed to the siblings, before the problem came to light in late 2020. On Zedra’s Part 8 claim, which Mr Tustain’s current deputies supported, Chief Master Shuman granted the declarations sought.

The July 2011 order’s reference to a discounted gift trust did not help: “[a] discounted gift trust and a gift-and-loan trust are materially different structures” (paragraph 41). The settlements engaged s.18(1)(h) MCA 2005, a power that s.20(3)(a) MCA 2005 reserves to the court, and required a further application, which was never made. Chief Master Shuman held that they were void, not merely voidable, because the defect went to the existence of authority rather than the manner of its exercise:

  1. The Court’s involvement is therefore not merely supervisory. The Court’s approval supplies the authority which permits the disposition to occur. The statutory scheme contemplates that the settlement derives its legal foundation from that approval.

In reaching this conclusion, Chief Master Shuman drew support from Re Beaney [1978] 1 WLR 770, among other authorities. As the settlements were void, the trustees held the assets on a resulting trust for Mr Tustain, which arose by operation of law (see paragraph 74). The loans, which fell outside both Mr Yeadon’s investment powers and the authority granted in relation to gifts, were also void ab initio (see paragraphs 78–79).

Comment

Section 20(3)(a) MCA 2005 means that a deputy can never be given power to settle P’s property, however widely their general authority is drawn. Only the court can decide that a settlement should be made, and its order must cover the settlement actually executed.

Zedra shows how easily that can be missed. The restriction had been spelt out in the 2006 Extended General Order, and the July 2011 order referred to a discounted gift trust. But those involved treated the settlements as part of Mr Tustain’s investment and estate planning, and no one went back to the court when the plan changed. Deputies and their advisers should read an order for what it actually authorises. If the plan changes, they should make a fresh application before anything is signed.

Because the defect went to the existence of authority, the settlements were void, and nothing done afterwards could cure them. Some fifteen years of administration must now be unwound and, as the s.61 judgment shows, much of the cost falls on Mr Tustain’s own estate.

 

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