Zedra Trust Company (UK) Limited v Graham David Tustain (Section 61)

9th October 2026

Judge

Chief Master Shuman

Citation(s)

  • [2026] EWHC 2576 (BP)

Summary

In Zedra Trust Company (UK) Limited v Graham David Tustain [2026] EWHC 2578 (BP) (discussed above), Chief Master Shuman held that six discretionary settlements made in 2011 by Mr Tustain’s then property and affairs deputy were void ab initio, because the Court of Protection had never authorised them. The assets had remained Mr Tustain’s throughout, held for him on bare resulting trust.

This second judgment deals with the consequences for the professional trustee (formerly Barclays Bank Trust Company Limited), which had administered the assets for about fifteen years on the wrong assumption that the trusts were valid. It sought relief from personal liability under s.61 Trustee Act 1925, authority to keep its past remuneration, payment for unwinding the arrangements, and its costs. It succeeded on all of those applications.

The deputy, Nigel Yeadon, was a solicitor who conducted the 2011 Court of Protection application himself. Barclays Wealth advised on the planning, recommended trust-based arrangements and offered trustee services. The order of 5 July 2011 referred to a discounted gift trust, but did not authorise the settlements eventually executed. Distributions of £133,000 were later made to Mr Tustain’s siblings.

To ensure “the benefit of full adversarial argument,” Chief Master Shuman directed Mr Tustain, acting by his deputies as litigation friends, to argue against relief (paragraph 5).  The questions were whether the trustee had acted reasonably and ought fairly to be excused.  The standard is reasonableness, not perfection, but it is likely to be higher for a paid trustee (Santander UK plc v RA Legal Solicitors [2014] EWCA Civ 183).

Barclays Wealth knew that the planning depended on what the Court of Protection regime allowed. The judge nevertheless held that responsibility for obtaining the necessary authority “rested principally with Mr Yeadon” (paragraph 31). The July 2011 order followed an application that had included trust-based planning, it referred to a discounted gift trust, and it said nothing about a further application. That was “capable of supporting the understanding that the Court of Protection process had supplied the authority required for implementation” (paragraph 34). The decisive statutory point “was missed by Barclays Wealth, Mr Yeadon and the other professionals involved” (paragraph 40). The trustee’s conduct “remained within the range reasonably open to a professional trustee” (paragraph 41).

On “fairness,” Chief Master Shuman distinguished between spending on managing and preserving the assets and the £133,000 distributions, which “transferred value to persons who possessed no beneficial entitlement under the resulting trust” (paragraph 47). Both, however, arose from the same mistake. Once the defect came to light, the trustee had investigated and brought the matter to court. Relief was granted for remuneration and expenses charged to the assets, liabilities discharged and the distributions, up to a date to be fixed in the order (paragraphs 50–51).

The trustee could also keep its remuneration even though the express trusts never existed. The trustee had administered property held on the resulting trust, so s.29(1) Trustee Act 2000 applied; the court’s inherent jurisdiction led to the same result (paragraphs 55–63). Chief Master Shuman held that the trustee could also charge its ordinary rates for unwinding the arrangements. Both parties’ costs are to be assessed on the indemnity basis and paid from the assets held for Mr Tustain (paragraph 72).

Comment

While Chief Master Shuman’s reasoning in the decision is undoubtedly sound, the result is uncomfortable. A solicitor acting as Mr Tustain’s court-appointed deputy put more than £2.7 million of his money into trusts from which he was excluded, without the authority the MCA 2005 requires. Fifteen years later, the trustee has been relieved of liability and keeps its remuneration, and both sides’ costs are to come out of Mr Tustain’s assets. The cost of a professional mistake fell on the person the statutory scheme exists to protect.

Professional trustees should not take too much comfort from the finding of reasonableness, which was closely tied to the facts. Now that the point has been spelt out, it will be harder to say it was reasonably missed in other cases. Anyone asked to act as trustee of a settlement made on P’s behalf should check that the order authorises that specific settlement.

Finally, the direction that Mr Tustain’s deputies argue against relief is a sensible model wherever P’s estate will, in effect, bear the cost of relief granted to a professional.

 

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