‘An Affront to Common Sense’: The Court of Appeal Dismisses the Appeal in Christian Gotti v Karen Perrett

“An affront to common sense”: Court of Appeal roundly dismisses the Appellant’s contention that the County Court did not have jurisdiction to order damages and costs against him after discharging his “deeply misconceived” interim injunction.

On 22 September 2025 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in Christian Gotti v Karen Perrett [2025] EWCA Civ 1168. The Appellant, Mr Gotti, is the owner of a cosmetic surgery company called Signature Medical Limited. The Respondent, Mrs Perrett, is an independent cosmetic surgery patient advocate. In 2023 Mr Gotti persuaded a District Judge in the Worcester County Court to grant him an interim injunction under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 prohibiting Mrs Perrett from posting anything on social media which he considered “defamatory” of his company or its staff. Mrs Perrett was a litigant-in-person. His application was brought on form N16A, the general form of application for an injunction.  He did not issue a Part 8 claim form as required for harassment claims in the County Court by CPR 65.28.

The interim injunction included a penal notice. The order was granted in spite of the County Court not having jurisdiction to hear an action for libel or slander, an interim injunction not being available in defamation where the defendant proposes to defend the claim (as here) and the court lacking jurisdiction under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 because the jurisdictional reach of section 3 is limited to England and Wales whereas Mr Gotti lived in Scotland. The District Judge was not referred to section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“freedom of expression”) and the enhanced test for interim relief which it imposes (Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee [2005] 1 AC 253).

Moreover, the interim injunction was granted in the absence of a claim from Mr Gotti, an undertaking to issue one or an undertaking for damages (contrary to the requirements of the former PD 25A). Mrs Perrett instructed solicitors. She applied to discharge the interim injunction and for damages and costs. At this point, in what the Court of Appeal agreed amounted to a “spectacular volte face” Mr Gotti claimed that because he had not issued a claim form the Court had no jurisdiction to hear Mrs Perrett’s application. It was asserted that the proceedings were a “nullity” and that whilst the interim injunction should be discharged (because it should not have been granted in the first place) the Court did not have the power to order damages or costs against Mr Gotti because there were no “proceedings” before it.

Although Mr Gotti accepted that his application for an interim injunction was “deeply misconceived” and should never have been made, he nonetheless maintained that Mrs Perrett, who had been subject to his unlawful injunction for 7 months, was not entitled to a remedy. The County Court disagreed. The Deputy District Judge who heard Mrs Perrett’s application deemed that the Court did have jurisdiction and recorded that Mr Gotti’s position was “unattractive”. Mr Gotti appealed. The Circuit Judge granted permission in spite of also recording that the “practical effect of the claimant’s submissions are unattractive”. The appeal was dismissed.

Mr Gotti appealed to the Court of Appeal. Lewison LJ granted permission to bring a second appeal. Whilst observing that his argument was “an affront to common sense”, permission was allowed on the basis that, “The centrality of a claim form (either under part 7 or Part 8) to civil proceedings is one of considerable importance. I regard that as a compelling reason for the grant of permission to bring this second appeal, irrespective of its prospects of success”.

In a detailed judgment King, Stuart-Smith and Cobb LJJ comprehensively dismissed Mr Gotti’s appeal, agreeing with the judges below that the issue of an N16A application form constituted the commencement of “proceedings” to which the CPR applied:

1. First, “in granting the application the court was exercising an equitable jurisdiction confirmed by statute (section 38 [County Courts Act 1984], as derived from section 37(1) [Senior Courts Act 1981])” [65]. As held by the House of Lords in Fourie v Le Roux [2007] UKHL 1, “Provided the court has in personam jurisdiction over the person against whom an injunction, whether interlocutory or final, is sought, the court has jurisdiction, in the strict sense, to grant it.” As confirmed by the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers [2023] UKSC 47, “it is now well established that the grant of injunctive relief is not always conditional on the existence of a cause of action”.
2. Secondly, “the term ‘proceedings’ in section 38 [County Courts Act 1984] itself is wide enough to include an application for pre-claim injunctive relief.  The term ‘proceedings’ is not defined in the CPR and is… used inconsistently within the CPR to refer to the period after a claim is issued, but also to the period in which the court is exercising a jurisdiction in the strict sense before a claim is issued.” [67] The word “proceedings” is not a term of art under the general law (Plevin v Paragon Personal Finance Ltd [2017] UKSC 23).
3. “Thirdly, and in any event, the county court has a discrete costs’ jurisdiction which could be properly invoked in the instant case. Section 51 [Senior Courts Act 1981] establishes that the “costs of and incidental to all proceedings in… the county court, shall be in the discretion of the court”.  The word ‘proceedings’ in this context must be given the same wide interpretation as discussed above” [73].
4. “Fourthly, if the Appellant were to be correct in his submission that the injunction application launched in July 2023 did not constitute ‘proceedings’, then this would effectively disapply the overriding objective (CPR r.1) to the management and determination of that application; there would be no obligation on the court under the CPR to deal with the application “justly” and at proportionate cost.  That simply cannot, in my judgment, be right.” [75]
5. Fifthly, the “fallacy” of the Appellant’s case was exposed by his concession that the County Court had the power to grant the interim injunction and to discharge it. “The Appellant’s acceptance of the court’s “jurisdiction” both to make and discharge the interim injunction is inconsistent with his contention that the application was effectively a ‘nullity’ and/or that it did not have “jurisdiction” (or the power) to make ancillary orders, including as to costs, and as to damages incurred by the Respondent as a result of the wrongful grant of the injunction.” [77].

The Court of Appeal also dismissed the appeal based on Mrs Perrett’s alternative ground, agreeing with the Circuit Judge below that CPR 3.10 could be invoked to correct Mr Gotti’s error of procedure in using an N16A application form rather than an N208 Part 8 claim form to issue his claim. The Court noted that in accordance with PD 65 certain types of claims (albeit not under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997) are treated as though they are brought by the issue of an N16A. It had previously been held by the Court of Appeal in Hannigan v Hannigan [2000] EWCA Civ 159 that where proceedings had been initiated using the wrong form CPR 3.10 allowed the defect in procedure to be corrected. Applied to the present facts the Court concluded that “the error of procedure in filing a N16A rather than a N208 could be corrected under CPR r.3.10, with the effect that the form N16A stands as a claim form in the proceedings.” [88].

In its concluding remarks the Court was emphatic in dismissing Mr Gotti’s appeal. It would be, “unconscionable for the Appellant to be able to profit from his actions in issuing a misconceived application without facing the financial and other consequences of doing so.” [89] (Cobb LJ). The Court reiterated that the appeal was “an affront to common sense” [92] & [93] (Stuart-Smith and King LJJ)

39 Essex Chambers’ barrister David Mitchell acted for Mrs Perrett led by Aiden Eardley KC and instructed by Rupert Cowper-Coles, Samatha Thompson and Megan Grew of RPC.