Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys: Clarifying (and Complicating) the Conduct of Litigation

The decision of Sheldon J in Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB) has generated significant concern within the legal profession, particularly in firms that rely on supervised paralegals. Although the Judgment addresses a relatively narrow statutory question concerning the right to conduct litigation its implications for day‑to‑day litigation practice are widespread. This article provides a summary of the Judgment and identifies the practical issues that now arise

Facts

The claimant, Charles Russell Speechlys, instructed another law firm, GBS, to recover unpaid fees from the defendants, Ms Mazur and Mr Stuart.  The Claim Form for the debt recovery was signed by GBS. The Particulars of Claim were signed by an employee of GBS named Mr Middleton who identified himself as a Senior Litigation Executive but was not a solicitor admitted to the role.

The defendants argued that Mr Middleton had unlawfully conducted litigation since he did not hold a practising certificate. They sought a direction that Mr Middleton be replaced with a qualified solicitor. The case was stayed by Deputy District Judge Campbell pending receipt of a statement from a partner at GBS giving a full explanation of the work Mr Middleton had carried out, failing which the claim would be struck out

During the stay GBS self-referred to the Solicitors Regulation Authority (‘SRA’) and Mr Middleton was replaced by a qualified solicitor. The SRA decided not to investigate the case following GBS’s self-referral, stating that “[GBS’] employees are permitted to undertake reserved legal activities due to section 21(3) [LSA]. We are satisfied that Mr Middleton has not conducted reserved legal activity without entitlement to do so”.

The claimant applied for the stay to be lifted, arguing that Mr Middleton had in fact been entitled to conduct the litigation. The case came before HHJ Simpkiss who agreed that Mr Middleton had been so entitled and as a result ordered the defendants were to pay the claimant’s costs of the application to lift the stay of £10,653.

The defendants appealed the decision on costs which then came before Sheldon J. Recognising the potential significance of the issue concerning the entitlement to conduct litigation  Sheldon J invited submissions from the Law Society and the SRA before finalising his Judgment.

Statutory Background

The Legal Services Act 2007 (LSA) identifies certain activities as “reserved legal activities”, including the conduct of litigation and the exercise of a right of audience. A person may carry out a reserved activity only if they are an authorised person or fall within a statutory exemption.

Section 14 LSA makes it a criminal offence for a person to carry out a reserved activity without entitlement to do so. Section 13 LSA provides that such entitlement must be determined solely in accordance with the LSA.

It is clear from the LSA (sections 15 and 16) that there is a distinction between the entitlement of an authorised person and that of their employees. Section 16 in particular would be redundant if employees were automatically entitled to carry out reserved activities simply because their employer was authorised (see paragraph [55] of Mazur).

Issue 1: Whether a non‑authorised individual may conduct litigation under supervision

Supervision does not confer authorisation. Sheldon J held that a non‑authorised individual may not conduct litigation, even if acting under the supervision of an authorised person. Employment by an authorised person does not therefore confer authorisation to carry out reserved legal activities upon employees. 

In particular, he clarified that Section 21 LSA, which the SRA had relied on when declining to investigate Mr Middleton’s conduct, was concerned with the extent of regulation, not authorisation to conduct reserved legal activities.

The Judgment emphasises that Parliament has expressly permitted supervised delegation in certain reserved areas, but not in relation to the conduct of litigation. For example, Schedule 3 paragraph 1(7) creates an exemption permitting a non‑authorised individual to exercise a right of audience in hearings held in chambers (excluding reserved family proceedings) where: (a) their work includes assisting in the conduct of litigation, and (b) they act on the instructions and under the supervision of an authorised person. However, no equivalent exemption exists for the conduct of litigation generally. Parliament had created express carve‑outs in other areas but had not done so here.

Issue 2: What constitutes the “conduct of litigation”?

This is the more pressing practical question.

At paragraph 64 Sheldon J distinguished between supporting an authorised person in the conduct of litigation (permissible)and conducting litigation under supervision (impermissible).

However he expressly declined to determine whether Mr Middleton’s actions amounted to the conduct of litigation, stating at paragraph 67 that it was unnecessary for the appeal to decide this.

Schedule 2, paragraph 4 defines the conduct of litigation as:

1. issuing proceedings before any court in England and Wales;
2. the commencement, prosecution and defence of such proceedings; and
3. the performance of any ancillary functions (e.g., entering appearances).

Frustratingly this definition is of limited use, particularly as it lacks detail on ‘ancillary functions’.

The BSB has since issued guidance identifying activities that barristers should not undertake unless authorised to conduct litigation. These include:

• issuing proceedings or applications,
• filing acknowledgments,
• giving an address for service,
• filing documents at court,
• issuing notices of appeal or notifying the court that a review is sought,
• signing disclosure lists,
• laying an information in the magistrates’ court.

The guidance also identifies activities that barristers may undertake which do not constitute the conduct of litigation, including:

• conducting correspondence,
• lodging documents for hearings,
• drafting and exchanging skeleton arguments,
• liaising over court orders,
• instructing experts.

The difficulty is that the boundary between “supporting” and “conducting” remains unclear. The statutory definition is broad, and the guidance, while helpful, is not determinative. At present it appears the concept of taking responsibility for a particular step in the litigation is key.

Practical Implications

A breach of the LSA 2007 does not immediately nullify proceedings or invalidate steps previously taken. However pending further guidance from the Court of Appeal firms face a period of uncertainty. Key issues include:

• Potential criminal liability for employees who inadvertently undertake reserved activities;
• Regulatory exposure for firms whose systems assume that supervised paralegals may perform tasks that now appear prohibited;
• Operational impact on bulk‑litigation practices, which may require increased solicitor involvement;
• Costs being potentially irrecoverable where work amounting to the conduct of litigation has already been carried out by non-authorised persons.

Firms may need to review workflows and consider restricting certain tasks to authorised individuals until the position is clarified.

In the authors’ recent experience Judges at all levels are alive to the issues raised by Mazur and frequently question an individual’s right to sign Court documents even in the absence of a challenge by the parties themselves. In one recent Costs and Case Management Conference the hearing was adjourned pending receipt of a witness statement by the individual who signed the Claim Form, Particulars of Claim and Costs Budget which detailed their experience and the work involved. If there may be a question about an individual’s right to conduct litigation firms may wish to pre-emptively file a witness statement prior to any hearing detailing that person’s experience and the work involved. However it is acknowledged this adds its own cost, complexities and delay.

The decision in Mazur also has wider implications for advocacy and rights of audience. In the recent County Court decision of Vehicle Control Services Limited v Stephen Langley [2026] EWCC 1 District Judge Pratt held that a solicitor’s agent was not an exempt person for the purposes of Schedule 3 LSA and had no rights of audience to appear at a small claims track trial. In the Judge’s view conducting advocacy was not in of itself assisting the conduct of the litigation.

Thankfully this period of uncertainty may not last long. There are a number of reserved judgments pending at the Senior Courts Costs Office concerning the impact of Mazur on costs recovery. The Mazur case is also being appealed to the Court of Appeal with a hearing due to take place on 24 February 2026. It is hoped that further appellate court guidance will settle the nerves of many firms in due course.

Conclusion

Mazur represents a strict, text‑based interpretation of the LSA. The Judgment exposes contemporary litigation practice that does not align neatly with the statutory framework. Further judicial clarification will be essential to provide certainty for practitioners and to ensure that litigation can continue to be conducted efficiently and lawfully. Chambers will provide an update after the Court of Appeal has handed down Judgment later this year which we hope will provide welcome clarity.

A link to the Judgment can be found here: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/2025/2341.pdf.